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INTRODUCTION 
 
In high income countries, there is nearly universal popular support for boycotts against 
products using child labor or punitive sanctions against countries with high levels of child 
labor. This essay assumes that the reason for this popular support is a concern for the well- 
being of these child laborers. Consumer boycotts or sanctions should then be viewed by 
advocates as successful if they make children in low-income countries better off. 
 
This essay argues that much of the popular debate on boycotts and sanctions suffers from 
a failure to consider what children will do if they are not working. To answer this 
question, the responsible activist or policymaker must understand why children work. 
 
While some circumstances of child laborers are so insidious that policies even more 
aggressive than boycotts may be justified, most of the work performed by children in low 
income countries reflects the desperateness of their family's poverty. For these cases, if 
consumer boycotts diminish the earnings power of children, then the incidence of the boycott 
can be on the poorest of the poor. In this sense, a consumer boycott of products made with 
child labor can be equivalent to a consumer boycott of poverty relief for both child laborers 
and their families. 
 
 
WHY DO CHILDREN WORK? 
 
Researchers, policymakers, and social activists all vary in how they view the 
determinants of child labor. Central in this debate is disagreement over how parents in 
developing countries view child labor. In one view, parents view children as nothing more 
than a source of income today. Parents do not consider the welfare of their children or the 
future earnings potential of children in their decisions about how much a child works. This 
view implies that children work so long as the return to their work is non-negative. Thus, 
variation in the availability of earnings opportunities for children explains differences 
in child labor supply. 
Should we boycott child labour ? 
Éthique et économique/Ethics and Economics, 1, 2003   
http://ethique-economique.net/ 
2 
 
There is almost no empirical support for this view of why children work. In contrast, 
consider the empirical evidence from a recent study in Vietnam (Edmonds and 
Pavcnik2003). Between 1993 and 1998, Vietnam liberalized its rice markets. Because most 
Vietnamese households produce rice, the resulting increase in rice prices expanded the 
return to child labor. Nevertheless, child labor declined by almost 20 percent during this 
period. Why? Edmonds and Pavcnik find that households appear to use the additional 
income that they are earning as a result of rice market liberalizations to replace income 
previously earned by children. Children have the opportunity to work more, their work will 
bring more income to the family than it did before liberalization, but yet children work 
less. Consequently, rather than callously exploiting increased earnings opportunities, 
parents in Vietnam use additional income to reduce child labor, the opposite of the 
outcome predicted by the view that parents view children as nothing more than a source of 
income. 
 
An alternative theory to the callous parent's hypothesis is that parents have the best 
interests of their family, including the child laborer, at heart. Child labor is the outcome of a 
difficult household decision. Parents weigh the costs of child labor against its return. The 
return to child labor is the additional income (real or in-kind) that the child brings into 
its household. The costs of child labor include any direct health or well-being costs of work 
as well as the opportunity cost of child labor. The opportunity cost of child labor depends 
on what the child would do in the absence of work. Children may attend school or have 
more time for play, both of which may have immediate and long-term consequences 
for the welfare of children. Thus, this model posits that child labor is a rational household 
decision. Child labor occurs because the return to work is relatively high or the return to not 
working is relatively low. 
 
The return to work for children may be high for two reasons. First, the popular press often 
emphasizes that demand for child labor is high in certain occupations. Ceteris paribus, 
higher labor demand leads to higher wages, and higher wages encourage households to 
send children to work. There is some evidence to support the theory that higher child wages 
lead to increases in child labor. For example, Bhalotra and Heady (2001) find a positive 
correlation between the within household earnings opportunities of children and child 
labor in rural Pakistan. Duryea and Arends-Kuenning (2003) find that better local labor 
market opportunities for children are associated with more child labor in urban Brazil. 
 
Second, child wages may be very low, but because of low parental incomes, the household’s 
marginal utility of income in the present may be very high. Thus, despite low wages, the 
household’s value of the child’s income may be very high. For example, in the case of a 
household that is living below subsistence levels, a small amount of income may be the 
difference between life and death. It is through this mechanism that poverty creates child 
labor. 
 
There is some evidence from Vietnam which suggests that child labor declines 
dramatically when households pass subsistence levels. Edmonds (2002) notes that in the 
cross-sectional living standards distribution, there is a range just above the poverty 
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line (defined as the estimated costs of buying 2100 calories per day per person plus some 
basic nonfood expenditures) where child labor declines dramatically. Edmonds also notes 
that with the economic growth experienced in the 1990s in Vietnam, living standards 
improve so that most households move from below subsistence to well above subsistence. 
In this way, he finds that 80 percent of the decline in child labor observed in Vietnamese 
households that exit poverty in the 1990s can be explained by improvements in living 
standards. 
 
This evidence from Vietnam is consistent with the cross-country picture that suggests a 
strong negative correlation between living standards and child labor. Figure 1 plots the labor 
market participation rates of children 10-14 against GDP per capita deflated for 
purchasing power parity. 
 
Figure 1: Child Labor and Income Per Capita across Countries in 1995 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
source: ILO (1999) and Heston and others (2002) 
 
A glance across countries reveals a strong correlation between GDP and child labor. In the 
world’s poorest nations with per capita incomes below $1,500 in 1995, it is not unusual to 
find over 30% of children working. In contrast, child labor is rare in countries with per 
capita incomes above 8,000 U.S. Dollars. In fact, the relationship between child labor and 
living standards is so strong that variation in GDP per capita alone can explain 75 of 
the cross-country variation in child labor. A simple linear regression of child labor 
participation rates on the log of real GDP per capita for households with a GDP per 
capita below 8,000 suggests that the income elasticity of child labor participation is -1. That 
is, if one is willing to extrapolate from the cross-country comparisons in figure 1, a 10 
percent increase in GDP per capita would be associated with a 10 percent decline in child 
labor. While it is possible that the earnings opportunities of children may be higher in low-
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income countries, it seems more likely that this strong negative correlation reflects the 
link between poverty and child labor. 
 
Children may work, because the return to child labor is high as a result of high wages to 
children or low parental income. However, what matters for child labor is whether the return 
to child labor is high relative to the return to not working. There are a number of reasons that 
the return to not working may be relatively low. First, schooling may be unavailable or very 
low quality. Schooling may be unavailable because it is too costly in terms of travel time, 
direct fees, or indirect costs. For example, a recent UNICEF study of children that do not 
attend primary school in Nepal found that 13 percent did not attend school because of a 
lack of availability (National Planning Commission Secretariat 1996). An additional 29 
percent did not attend school, because the household could not afford the fees. Low school 
quality is a perennial problem in low income countries, and several studies (Case and Yogu 
1999 is one example) find a strong association between school quality and school 
attendance. When schools are ineffective, households may resort to more traditional 
means (such as work) to educate their children or forego education altogether. 
 
Second, even with large returns to schooling or play, there may be agency problems 
such that parents do not internalize the return fully. This has often been cited as an 
explanation for gender differences in educational attainment in India: Girls move away; 
boys stay near home (e.g. Dreze and Sen 1995). Thus, even if market returns to 
education are greater for girls, the household decision maker does not internalize them. 
 
Third, information problems may mean that the parents' actual return to having the 
child do something other than work is higher than the return to having the child work but 
that parents do not know this. Thus, if parents had full information, they would conclude 
that the child should not work, but with the information they have, parents mistakenly send 
the child to work. This could occur if parents misperceived the return to their child's 
education. Information problems about working conditions may be particularly important in 
explaining some of the worst forms of child labor. Poor parental information has been 
highlighted to explain why some households in east Asia allow their daughters to go work 
as prostitutes or servants in big cities. Households permit this, because they do not know 
that these atrocities will happen to their children (UNICEF 2001). 
 
Fourth, financial market imperfections may prevent households from considering future 
returns to investments in children. That is, there may be a large return to education, but 
parents cannot borrow against that return. Liquidity constraints cause child labor decisions to 
depend on the marginal utility of income in the present period. Two recent studies suggest 
that liquidity constraints may force households to send children to work even when the 
return to education is higher than the market return to child labor. For example, Beegle and 
others (2003) examine how households in rural Tanzania respond to unexpected crop 
losses. They find that households use increase child labor to mitigate the consequences 
of large crop losses. Households with better access to credit employ less labor to buffer 
unexpected crop losses. In a second example, Edmonds (2002) considers how households 
in South Africa respond to the timing of an anticipated cash transfer. Households do not 
appear to be able to fully incorporate future income into present decisions. Thus, child 
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labor supply and schooling depend on the timing of income. Because of the presence of 
financial market imperfections, parents may not even be able to consider whether they 
would rather children not work. Children must work to sustain the household. 
 
Households that cannot meet their basic needs depend upon the income of their children for 
survival. Without the income from working children, parents in poor households may 
have to choose which children to feed. Moreover, schooling is expensive in most of the 
developing world. Thus, it is not uncommon to see children working to support their own 
schooling or that of their siblings. In this way, efforts to prevent children from working 
could have a serious, negative impact on the well-being of both working and non-
working children as well as their whole family. 
 
 
2. HOW DO CONSUMER BOYCOTTS AFFECT CHILD LABOR? 
 
Consumer boycotts aim to lower labor demand for child labor. To consider the consequence 
of a drop in labor demand in one industry, it is necessary to make an assumption about the 
availability of other forms of work to children. Given the endless array of activities open to a 
child within her own household, it seems reasonable to assume that if a child cannot work in 
one activity because of an effective consumer boycott, there are other employment 
opportunities available to her. In this context, there are three types of effects of consumer 
boycotts on child labor. 
 
1. Children are diverted into other work. In a typical model of wage determination, child 
and adult labor are perfect substitutes (e.g. Basu and Van 1998). Equilibrium then 
implies that the wages of children and adults are equal when adjusted for productivity 
differences. The available evidence is broadly consistent with the idea that differences in 
wages between adults and children reflect differences in their productivity (e.g. Levison 
and others 1998). When child and adult labor can substitute, an employer can shift between 
adult and child labor. If one type of firm can no longer hire children, it employs more 
adults and children shift into the work previously performed by adults. It may be 
worthwhile to note that in the standard small country trade model, wages are determined by 
international markets (see Dixit 2000 for an example). Thus, consumer boycotts of one 
good because of child labor may do nothing other than change the type of work children 
perform. Depending on local conditions, this may or may not be desirable from the 
perspective of an outsider concerned with child welfare. 
 
2. The wages of children decline. If wages are determined by local markets, a drop in labor 
demand may lower the return to child labor. If child labor is own-price elastic, 
declining child wages can lead to a decline in child labor. Moreover, because the relative 
return to schooling (or not working) then increases, school attendance may rise. This 
scenario assumes that there are schools available to displaced children, and it is most 
directly related to reducing child labor that owes to information or agency issues. 
However, a reduction in child wages may be desirable only if there are not substantive 
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financial market imperfections in the economy. With liquidity constraints, the household's 
need to send a child to work could increase if wages decline because of the household's 
higher marginal utility of income (under an assumption of diminishing marginal utility 
in income). Moreover, the loss of income associated with a decline in wages may affect the 
activities of all children in the household. Thus, a decline in child wages may increase or 
decrease child labor depending on local conditions. 
 
3. Adult wages rise. If employers shift from child to adult labor as a result of the 
boycott, there will be a rise in labor demand for adults. If wages are locally determined, the 
resulting increase in adult wages (with financial market imperfections in place) can lower 
the marginal utility of income and thereby lead to a decline in child labor. This 
optimistic scenario is probably the one most advocates of consumer boycotts hope for. It 
has a formal articulation within economics in Basu and Van (1998). Notice, this scenario 
is based on several strong assumptions. First, it presumes that an increase in wages for 
adult labor will not draw in more labor through migration or changes in the labor supply of 
residents. If adult labor is own-price elastic, increases in adult wages from a consumer 
boycott will be attenuated with an increase in labor supply. Second, this scenario 
assumes that there are activities such as schooling that the household would prefer the child 
to participate in. Thus, it does nothing to solve the problem that the household's return to 
no child labor may be relatively low because of schooling, agency, or information 
problems. The theorized decline in child labor comes through solving the liquidity 
constraints problem. Third, this scenario assumes that the affected employer is large 
enough to have a substantial impact on local labor markets. Thus, in even the best of 
scenarios, the effect of consumer boycotts on child labor supply depends on local 
conditions. 
 
 
3. IMPLICATION FOR CONSUMERS 
 
The main implication of this discussion is that information about local environmental 
conditions is critical in deciding whether to support a consumer boycott. The educated 
consumer should understand in a nuanced way why children are working in a given 
industry, what will happen to local labor markets in the absence of child labor in the 
target industry, and what other options are available to children that would be displaced 
by an effective consumer boycott. When destitution drives children to work, preventing the 
employment of children may do nothing other than further drive children and their families 
into the despair of poverty. 
 
However, with full information, it is conceivable that a case could be made for a 
consumer boycott in some contexts. For example, there may be cases where the presence of 
children in the labor market depresses adult wages so much that children have to work 
even though adult wages without children in the labor market would be high enough to 
eliminate child labor supply. Moreover, even in the case when poor households are made 
worse off in the short term by a consumer boycott, consumers may decide that this is 
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acceptable. This is likely to be the case for egregious human rights abuses. However, 
without proper consideration of the context of child labor, boycotts of child labor may 
just be a way to boycott poverty relief. In this way, consumer boycotts can hurt exactly the 
people they hope to help. 
 
So what options does this leave the concerned consumer? One policy option is to work to 
improve the conditions in which children work rather than to prevent children from 
working. Freeman (1998) argues that the enforcement of labor standards may address many 
of the concerns raised by consumer activists. To the extent that labor standards raise the 
costs of labor to an employer, they may be associated with many of the deleterious effects 
of consumer boycotts discussed herein. However, it is possible that implementation of 
basic standards may have a minimal impact on labor costs while significantly improve the 
working conditions of children. A second policy option is to work towards eliminating 
the reasons why children work. If the ire that fuels consumer boycotts could be 
redirected towards persistent support for poverty relief, schooling improvements, etc, it 
might be possible to attain a world where child labor was rare rather than pervasive. 
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